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The Internet and terrorism:  pathways towards terrorism & counter-terrorism 
 
Introduction 
The speed at which terrorist and extremist groups have embraced the possibilities 
offered by the Internet has been reflected in the sheer number of websites espousing 
support for terrorists, white supremacists and radical Islamic militants, among many 
others. Levin (2002) partially explains the growth of internet use by extremists and 
terrorists with reference to its economical and ‘far reaching’ nature.  The speed of 
Internet acquisition may also be attributed to its inherent nature; it is easy to access 
with a chaotic structure that facilitates anonymity, and an international character that 
affords an easy and effective arena for action (Tsafti & Weimann 2002). While 
violence remains essential to the terrorist movement for the psychological impact of 
terrorism, the Internet provides a safe, easy and cheap means of communicating, 
disseminating propaganda, gathering intelligence, promoting support, demonising the 
enemy and raising funds.  
 
Historically the Internet has been associated with military, scientific and academic 
institutions and communities, providing a particular historical and cultural context for 
online communication and membership. An important implication of this is that the 
internet can be used to explore “political action and affiliation online” (Kendall 1999, 
p. 63).  ‘Terrorist use of the Internet’ provides a new solution to the old problem of 
communication. Where once terrorist movements were reliant on ‘traditional’ forms 
of media to bring their ‘cause’ to the public, the Internet now facilitates a broad 
spectrum of communication possibilities, ranging from websites to virtual 
communities. While websites serve the important function of providing a link 
between movement and supporter, it is the virtual community that allows for the 
construction and maintenance of political and ideological discourses in support of that 
movement, providing the ‘public space’ supporters crave (Arendt 1990). Virtual 
communities can be likened to ‘communities of practice’ (Lave 1988; Wenger 1998), 
informal social learning environments which facilitate increasing commitment of 
group members to movements, including those movements that justify the use of 
terrorism and political violence to achieve their goals (Hundeide 2003). Virtual 
communities of practice are virtual spaces used effectively by members who interact 
in a meaningful community driven way. Regular community members pride 
themselves on their commitment to the community and the activities they pursue, for 
example communicating with others, disseminating their truth, creating a place where 
others can come to learn, offering validation to others on their ideological beliefs. 
Discourses created within these communities provide validation, justifying and 
legitimising the use of terrorism. These discourses are central to the ways that the 
Internet can contribute to the facilitation of involvement either online (within the 
virtual community) or offline (in a potentially more active capacity). Involvement 
within a virtual community and potential involvement in offline activities thus 
presents itself as a potential pathway toward individual radicalisation. For the purpose 
of this chapter, ‘radicalisation’ is defined as an end stage on a continuum that spans 
from lower level support to the involvement or willingness to be directly involved in 
violent terrorist activities. 
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A crucial issue here is whether the Internet can be considered a catalyst for action by 
terrorists and their supporters. To try to understand this issue it is useful to begin by 
asking some key questions relevant to this; why do terrorist movements and their 
supporters use the Internet, i.e. what functions does it serve and what pathways 
toward involvement are facilitated? 
 
Why do terrorist movements and their supporters use the Internet? 
Much has been written on terrorist use the Internet in relation to the function of 
websites (see for example Whine 1998, 1999, 2000; Tsafti & Weimann 2002; 
Conway 2003 & Weimann 2006a&b). It is widely agreed that terrorist use of the 
Internet incorporates, but is not limited to, resource acquisition, intelligence gathering, 
propaganda (including auto-propaganda), support and recruitment. While the physical 
membership of core activists of most terrorist movements is kept to a minimum both 
because of the psychological premium associated with restricted membership and for 
security reasons, there is no practical limit to the numbers of supporters sought by any 
terrorist movement. The Internet can be used as a catalyst for fostering support and 
recruitment, the different levels of involvement that websites and online communities 
make available to the supporter facilitate involvement at various levels; a supporter 
can send a donation, buy merchandise, support prisoners, chat online, become more 
active and distribute propaganda/fliers, or attend marches/demonstrations. Both online 
research and a consideration of relevant psychological literature and theory can 
further inform us about this process of potential radicalisation.  
 
Resource Acquisition 
Many websites that support a terrorist movement, link directly to online shopping 
facilities. Rather than serving as an income-generator that is of any real significance 
to the movement, in reality the symbolic nature of the products represent the true 
value of the commodities being offered. For example, via a right wing extremist 
online shop, browsers can purchase any of the following: music CDs (including entire 
collections of the music of famous Right Wing extremist music groups, such as 
Hammerskins), DVDs, flags, badges, pins, baseball caps, calendars, key rings, shirts, 
posters, and an extensive range of movement literature, including Hitler’s ‘Mein 
Kampf’, MacDonald’s ‘Turner Diaries’ and Duke’s ‘My Awakening’ (see for 
example websites http://www.resistance.com/catalog & http://www.aryanwear.com/). 
The selling of such materials via websites is not limited to Right Wing Extremist 
sites, although these may be some of the most prolific.  
 
Many websites also provide visitors with an option to directly donate funds, for 
example on opening the www.Kahane.org website,i a pop up invites you to donate 
funds directly to the movement. Others provide addresses where donations can be 
sent, for example National Alliance at www.natvan.com.  One of the more interesting 
examples of resource acquisition can be found on the Ulster Loyalist Information 
Services website, ii  the virtual home of the Loyalist Volunteer Force an extreme 
Loyalist faction based in Protestant areas of Belfast. This movement quickly realised 
that not all its supporters “feel comfortable in giving monetary donations”, but 
encourages donations of unwanted items: 
 
“Want to help out LVPW, but don’t feel comfordable (sic) with making monetary 
donations?  You can also help by donating various items.  Some of these items will be 
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used for obvious uses, others will be packaged as Christmas gifts for less fortunate 
families of imprisoned volunteers or widows.  Please review the list below, if you have 
any of the items and would like to donate them, please contact us at Projects. 
• Bullet Proof Vests - Any size, new or used.  These can be found used at 
reasonable prices on eBay 
• Computers (Pentium II or newer), software of use, computer games 
• Items that would make nice Christmas gifts for children of all ages. 
• You may also make a monetary donation, via PayPal by following the link 
below.” 
 
The purchase of items, often culturally significant to the movement, is important to a 
supporter providing a link to the organisation and its history, functioning not only as a 
means of donating some small amount to the organisation, but also serving to forge a 
tangible link between the supporter and the organisation. Donating money or goods to 
a movement may be seen as indicative of a belief that the goals of the movement are 
legitimate and that their means of achieving these goals, even through the use of 
violence and terrorism, are acceptable. This may be a first step on the pathway toward 
involvement. As one Right Wing extremist within the virtual community of 
Stormfront (www.stormfront.com) comments: 
 
“I was on the internet one night looking for a song on some file sharing program. I 
came across one called "White Power" by a band called Skrewdriver. I hated 
negroes, spics, gays, etc. and decided to download it. The second Ian Stuart shouted 
out "White Power 1,2,3,4" I  was HOOKED.” 
 
Intelligence Gathering 
The Internet is also an unsurpassable tool for information gathering. This does not 
automatically bring us into the realm of how the Internet can be used to gather 
information, using tools such as Google Earth or The Anarchists Cookbook, to cause 
destruction to critical infrastructures (although this is of course possible), but can also 
be considered from another perspective. The Internet is by now well known as being a 
fast and efficient way to gather information on people, places and groups all over the 
world. As such, terrorist organisations can avail of the opportunity to keep well 
informed on up to minute news on how they are perceived by the mass media, as well 
as providing the group with information on their perceived enemies and allies. The 
Internet may also be a way for ideologically similar groups to forge alliances across 
international borders which are inconsequential online. ‘Webrings’ are an important 
feature that supports this, facilitating the networking of websites that are used to 
express similar views, perspectives and ideologies. They allow the user to work more 
efficiently through related sites and can serve to mark implicit affiliations between 
groups. Evidence for this can be found through an examination of the links between 
websites, for example current online links between the Ulster Volunteer Force and the 
Neo-Nazi group Combat 18, and online links between Aryan Unity and the British 
People’s Party. Indeed, cyber-space is one place that serves as an ideal ground for 
contagion effects. Terrorist movements use websites to catalogue their successful 
operations. This is useful to boost member morale and can also serve as an effective 
tool to advertise successful violent campaigns. The Hizbollah websites for example, 
(www.hizbollah.org & www.almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon) provide coverage of 
successful para-military operations as feature items. 
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Propaganda  
 “Propaganda is an art requiring special talent. It is not mechanical, scientific work. 
Influencing attitudes requires experience, area knowledge, and instinctive judgement 
of what is the best argument for the audience”. Bogart (1976, p. 195-196) 
 
A visit to any website proclaiming support for the actions of a terrorist movement will 
at once reveal its most immediate purpose, propaganda. Terrorist website homepages 
demonstrates that the Internet can serve as a valuable tool to disseminate information 
about the objectives, strategies, tactics and other features of the group to influence the 
publics’ perception of them, their ideology and goals. The instrumental nature of 
terrorist violence serves to perform a variety of functions that go some way towards 
explaining the attractiveness of the strategy of terrorism for isolated, marginalised 
political groups, and an important primary function is that of communication. For 
most sub-state terror groups, their tactics are predicated on attempting to overthrow or 
effectively destabilise a political influence. Winning hearts and minds is central to 
this, and terrorists must justify and legitimate their activity with facts. Alerting the 
world to the grievances of a particular movement, as well as documenting the history 
of injustices suffered (real or imagined) by a particular minority (depending on the 
kind of terror group) is of primary importance and is central to any attempt to gain 
support. The message of the terrorist organisation must be credible and believed by 
the user if it is ever to progress to some sort of support that may be measurable and 
tangible.  
 
A pertinent example of this comes from the Hizbullah website 
(www.almasqriq.hiof.no/lebanon) which includes this detailed statement outlining the 
ideology of the group and dealing with the perception of Hizbullah in the west as a 
terrorist organisation. It relates the progression of the movement from ‘turbulent’ 
times of violence to its re-emergence as a ‘pivotal force’ in the Middle Eastern 
political arena. While recognising that the violent activities against Israel have been 
perceived as terrorism and thus condemned, it is defended as a ‘natural human 
reaction’ to the violence perpetrated by the Israeli occupying forces. This statement 
highlights the importance of justifications bound in rhetoric of righteousness and 
rationality. Such justifications facilitate the call for violence and promote the 
legitimacy of the movement and the goals they seek to achieve. 
 
 “The prevalent perception of Hizbullah in the "west" is of a militant, armed terrorist 
organization bent on abduction and murder. While the initial years of its emergence 
as a political movement in Lebanon were turbulent and controvertial (sic), The Party 
of God has matured to become an important and pivotal force in Middle East politics 
in general and Lebanese society in particular. Hizbullah does not believe it is right 
for some people in the world to view the Zionist Jewish occupation as accepted 
violence and terrorism, while they condemn the counter-violence, which is a natural 
human reaction to the Zionist violence and terrorism.” 
 
On a related note, propaganda on websites can be used to actively promote violent 
activity against specific targets.  For example, a website affiliated with The Animal 
Liberation Front, No Compromise (www.nocompromise.org), which defines itself as 
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“The militant, direct action news source of animal liberationists and their 
supporters.” includes within its gallery archive, photographs of Federal Agents. The 
images included in this part of the site “are photos of federal government officials 
who have nothing better to do with their time than harass activists”. This website also 
provides access to a “Directory of Abusers”, which lists labs conducting animal 
testing including their addresses and the home addresses and telephone numbers of 
the directors and managers of these labs. Finding this type of listing on a website is 
especially interesting, particularly in terms of its similarity to what are known as the 
‘Nuremberg Files’, a listing of abortion doctors in the U.S. which was distributed 
online by Anti-abortion extremists. Although the ‘Nuremberg Files’ were claimed not 
to be a death list, following its presence online a number of assassination attempts 
were made on abortion doctors, successful in the case of Dr. Selpian. Whilst court 
proceedings followed to ensure the removal of this list from the Internet alternate 
versions of it can still be found on particularly extremist anti-abortion websites.  
 
Websites are undoubtedly useful to terrorist movements in the orchestration of their 
propaganda campaigns. However, once a website of interest has been found by a 
supporter its role is limited and the role of the supporter remains relatively passive, 
limited to downloading information, perhaps donating funds. This is where virtual 
communities in support of terrorist movements constitute a significant change in the 
role of the online supporter. Through involvement in a virtual community the online 
supporter can move from the passive onlooker toward a potentially more active role. 
This progression is certainly interesting from a psychological perspective, particularly 
in terms of how online activities might inform our understanding of processes of 
involvement and pathways toward radicalisation in the offline world.  
 
Facilitating Involvement: Considering Virtual Communities of Terrorist Support 
The term virtual community is used here as an ‘anchor’, an already formulated notion 
of shared online space and communicative interaction between users. Community in 
cyberspace can be perceived in the same ways as communities in the physical world; 
they can be characterised by regular user interaction, most often with a sense of status 
associated with long–term membership, the construction of ‘relevant’ discourses with 
interactions adhering to community ‘norms’, with these often developed through a 
process of in-group monitoring.  
 
Virtual communities vary in their levels of technological sophistication and of course 
in terms of the content of the discourses created within them, particularly in terms of 
ideology, current affairs and so forth. Similarities lay primarily in how these 
communities function in particular ways, both for the individual and the group, in 
terms of communication, information dissemination, propaganda, ideological 
development, the development of a negotiated political identity (individual and 
group), and increasing involvement in support activities over time. Furthermore, these 
functions are important in relation to the social and psychological processes to which 
they relate, such as how social interaction within the community can be viewed in 
terms of processes themselves; processes of communication (including propaganda), 
processes of identity negotiation and processes of involvement and increased support 
and activity over time. 
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Research in this area (Bowman-Grieve 2006) indicates that the discourses created 
within virtual communities are fundamentally similar; community members use their 
virtual community to discuss and debate, to praise and to criticise, creating discourses 
related to issues of importance to the movement. Such discourses often consider how 
the movement might move forward to achieve their goals and aims and it is often 
from this perspective that the decision to use violence or terrorism is discussed, with 
the choice to use terrorism often justified as the only viable course of action.iii
 
Identity Negotiation, Recruitment & Radicalisation 
 “Everyone, Republican or otherwise has their own particular part to play. No part is 
too great or too small, no one is too old or too young to do something.” (Bobby Sands 
1954- 1981) 
 
Identity Negotiation 
The negotiation of self-identity is an important function of the virtual communities 
and an important process for members, many of whom join the community with little 
sense of their position on various issues and who therefore negotiate their views over 
time and through interaction with other, often more experienced, community 
members. This process is also important in relation to the status of members, with 
older members (those who have negotiated their political identity) interacting with 
newer (or less sure) members and facilitating their identity negotiation and 
development. Similarly this process of negotiation allow for the justifications and 
legitimations of support to be verbalised and reiterated providing validation for 
members. In-group validation serves an important psychological function for group 
members contributing to their sense of community and of the validity of their views 
and opinions, which are often in the minority in everyday life outside of this virtual 
community. In these communities supportive views for extremist and terrorist 
movements are acknowledged and accepted, thus normalising these ideologies for the 
individual, and contributing to the creation and sustenance of strongly held views that 
are more resistant to change in the long term. The processes involved in community 
justifications and validations can also contribute to increased ideological control. 
Whilst community members are encouraged to negotiate their political affiliations and 
ideologies through on-going interaction, other community members also encourage 
them in blatant and subtle ways to demonstrate their commitment and support through 
action and involvement. Thus, the ideology of the group and group processes within 
the virtual community can contribute to increased ideological control in in-group 
members, particularly those who seek to ‘prove’ their commitment to the group. 
 
Identity negotiation and ideological control occur over time, input from the individual 
community member and interaction with other community members. As such political 
identity is open to radicalisation within the online community. Wenger (1998) 
suggests that we experience identity in practice; that it is a lived experience within a 
specific community. Similarly the construction of identity can be viewed as a central 
part of learning (Lave and Wenger 1991; Packer and Goicoechea 2000). According to 
this argument, learning is viewed as social participation with the onus upon each 
individual to construct their own identity within the social space of the group. This 
occurs through processes of participation and interaction (Packer et al. 2000). 
Additionally, Wenger (1998) argues that we develop identity by assessing who we are 
in relation to the community in which we are practising members so that in a practical 
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sense, identity development occurs through participation and interaction within the 
community. This negotiation of identity is a reflexive process, where individuals must 
be capable of considering and reflecting on the meaning of their own identity 
throughout the process of negotiation. In this sense identity construction is a careful 
negotiation between the individual and the community.  
 
Recruitment & Radicalisation 
The discourses created and sustained within the virtual communities are used to 
disseminate information, to communicate ideologies, to promote and propagandise, to 
encourage involvement and throughout all of these to potentially facilitate the 
radicalisation of individuals and groups. These discourses seek to dehumanise the 
enemy, to delegitimise the enemy and to justify and legitimise the ideology of the 
movement. Their sustenance contributes to the community of validation that exists for 
members of the movement and their content contributes to the justifications of the use 
of the terrorism (often despite in-group differences of opinion). These discourses in 
particular promote the notion of a ‘right’ to act in whatever way necessary in the face 
of an ‘imminent’ threat, always identified as some ‘other’ that is wholly ‘evil’. Such 
ideals can contribute to the radicalisation process, making the decision to use violence 
or terrorism unavoidable and therefore the responsibility of the enemy.   
 
Committed virtual community members exist in a pre- or semi-radicalized state. In 
this state individuals are aware of the ‘conflict’ and the goals of the movement. They 
are open to movement propaganda that espouses the movement’s ideology.  Through 
online interaction they have negotiated a position, perhaps even a role for themselves 
as a supporter. They may have become involved in support activities, on and offline.  
In this sense virtual community involvement can be viewed as a potential pathway 
toward radicalisation. Increased involvement over time may parallel increased 
ideological development and control (as a justification for actions a priori or post 
hoc). Processes of support and involvement, facilitated by online interaction, can 
contribute to ideological control and individual radicalisation, particularly when these 
are viewed as incremental processes, with each stage linked with the previous and 
demonstrating increased involvement in increasingly illegal or violent activities and 
behaviours over time. If involvement is considered in this way, as a process 
increasing over time, then particular interventions at any of the various stages might 
be open to development. Individual radicalisation (i.e. individuals becoming involved 
in the support of or the carrying out of violent activities) while not facilitated by 
online interaction alone, may be related to earlier stages of the support and 
involvement process and the formation of interpersonal bonds and relationships, an 
important factor in the recruitment process (della Porta 1988, 1992; Sageman 2004). 
Arguably, the most potent combination to facilitate radicalisation that incorporates 
use of the Internet will be exposure to radical ideology online, in addition to exposure 
to radical ideology and behaviour in the physical world.  
 
Countering Terrorist use of the Internet  
 
Internet Regulation & the Role of Civil Society 
“It is essential to appreciate the very strong collective ethos of the Internet. From its 
inception Internet users have always been passionately in favour of internal control 
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and against outside influence. In effect, for many years the Internet has operated as a 
fully functioning anarchy.” (Langford 1998, p. 98) 
 
Regulating, governing and possibly censoring the Internet is met with complex 
arguments both for and against any such moves, primarily because it is not a simple 
thing to apply the traditional laws of a state or international community to the Internet 
which, as a vast network, recognises no international borders. Unfortunately, because 
of the nature of the beast and the lack of international legislation regulating it, 
websites and virtual communities in support of terrorism proliferate online. It is 
important to note that while some websites can be easily found (because those who 
construct and maintain them want them found by potential supporters), others are 
more difficult to track, particularly those which seek to remain hidden to all but a 
select membership.  Take for example the website “Alneda.com”, this is the name of 
the website believed to be the primary means of communication initially used by Al 
Qaeda (currently over fifty websites in support of Al Qaeda exist online (Weimann 
2006a)).  Legitimate service providers originally hosted Alneda.com and removed the 
site having been alerted to its contents. Although ownership of the domain name was 
lost, Alneda.com, continues to exist online according to Delio (2003). The website 
now appears to function as an Internet parasite, embedding itself within other 
websites without the owner’s knowledge, for example by burying itself in sub-
directory files. Although the site is not updated regularly it appears to be updated 
upon relocation, and its location is indeed difficult to ascertain at any given time and 
without the relevant knowledge. Generally, followers of the website are alerted to its 
newest location through posts on radical Bulletin Boards and particular mailing lists. 
As complicated as it may appear to regularly relocate a website and bury it within an 
already established (and apparently legal and unassociated) website, it is in reality a 
relatively uncomplicated manoeuvre manageable with ‘cracking’ tools that are 
currently available online (Delio 2003). 
  
Internet regulation and legislation are important issues; however the question of who 
does the regulating remains pertinent. As the Internet is a public domain, many 
Internet watchdogs, human rights groups and other concerned citizens argue that any 
decisions made with regard to the issue of regulation and/or censorship must seriously 
consider the wider implications of such issues and the importance of the role of civil 
society in making these decisions.  
 
Civil society refers to the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared 
interests, purposes and values. Civil society can be meaningful in contributing to the 
development of respect for diversity and tolerance and may be useful in bridging 
cultural divides (Shulman 2004). The institutional forms of civil society can be 
distinguished from those of the state and may include foundations, think tanks and 
other non-governmental organisations. Civil society as a concept has modernised over 
time and in relation to modernisation in our world. As such, the forms of civil society 
we see today offer new, alternative and innovative forms of solidarity, connectedness 
and civic and political engagement, in particular as these are now facilitated by the 
Internet (Ester & Vinken 2003). According to Shulman (2004) active civil society can 
enhance the vitality of democracy and may function as a means of easing interaction 
between the state and the individual. The Internet can facilitate a degree of 
organisational cohesion and coherence to groups outside of the political establishment 
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who seek to orchestrate campaigns of political protest without relying on the 
traditional mass media (Reilly 2003). While civil society currently has positive 
connotations it is important to note that not all civil society is good, for example the 
Ku Klux Klan was a civil society organisation. In fact terrorist movements, according 
to Reilly (2003, p. 1), “use the Internet like marginalised elements of “civil society” 
to communicate with sympathetic diasporas, disseminate propaganda and issue 
statements unfettered by the ideological refractions of the mass media”.  
 
Given the nature of terrorism, in particular the psychological element of this strategy 
with its aims of undermining public morale and creating an atmosphere of fear (which 
may incidentally lead to the acceptance of policy and legislation that effects public 
civil liberties over time, as has been seen post 9/11), it is important to recognise the 
role the public can play in counter- and anti- terrorism strategies, in particular the role 
of civil society. Because the Internet is a public domain offering almost unlimited 
access to the user, it is important that the public who use this technology are afforded 
the opportunity of monitoring this domain themselves. The appropriate role of civil 
society in addressing terrorist use of the Internet has not yet been clearly addressed. 
However, arguably its primary online role is in self-regulation; civil society can take 
the role of in-group monitors. However, as Jewkes (2002) points out, self regulation 
can too be problematic, in some cases giving rise to online vigilantism. Nevertheless, 
civil interest groups have the potential to act in a real and useful way in attempting to 
limit the use of the Internet by deviant, extremist or terrorist movements. 
 
Internet Haganah (Internet Defence) is a website dedicated to this purpose - 
researching, reporting and shutting down Internet websites currently being used to 
support terrorist organisations and their activities. Their focus is primarily on Islamist 
terrorist websites and the site itself is run on a voluntary basis. They argue that 
because the sites they target are usually in violation of their hosts’ terms of service 
action can be taken to have them removed. According to the website, volunteers have 
succeeded in shutting down more than 700 terrorist support sites. All of the sites 
removed represented organisations designated terrorist by the US State or Treasury 
Departments. Of course due to the very nature of the Internet it is not unusual to see 
many of these sites back online in a short period of time. However, this group of 
volunteers remains vigilant in their fight against terrorist use of the Internet. This 
group of volunteers represents a form of self-regulation and self-governance online; a 
group of concerned individuals working to remove terrorist support sites making them 
less accessible. 
 
The Internet and Possible Counter-Terrorism Initiatives 
Apart from Internet watchdogs and the role they might play, both civil society 
organisations and the government can also play an active role in using the Internet to 
counter terrorism in other ways, for example by attempting to counter the propaganda 
campaigns of such movements. In fact, the UN has historically used this approach 
particularly in relation to combating racism. The Internet offers no greater medium to 
launch such campaigns. Effective counter-propaganda campaigns can be conducted 
online, as terrorist and extremist movements have demonstrated through their own 
Internet use. Such propaganda campaigns must consider the importance of both the 
credibility of the communicator and the audience being targeted.  
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In considering this further it may be useful to use former terrorists or former 
supporters of terrorism in the dissemination of anti-terrorist material and propaganda. 
The experiences and perceptions of former terrorists or supporters can lend credibility 
to the anti-terrorist argument and may be particularly useful in reaching those who 
have become more entrenched in the ideology and the group they support. Similarly, 
propaganda campaigns must recognise the various audiences being targeted and their 
levels of commitment to the movement or ideology, which range from those who are 
‘on the fence’ to those who are supportive but not active in their support, to those who 
are actively involved in support related activities. The effectiveness of counter-
propaganda is dependent on various factors, such as the credibility of the 
communicator, the organisation of persuasive arguments, the use of fear arousing 
appeals, group and individual factors (Hovland et al. 1953). These factors warrant 
serious consideration in preparing and presenting such campaigns to public audiences.  
 
Crelinsten and Schmid (1992), also suggest that particular communication strategies 
and psychological operations (PsyOps) can contribute to the fight against terrorism. 
Arguably such strategies can also be effectively promoted online.  These 
communication strategies can be divided into those that are considered offensive or 
defensive operations, in other words those directed at one’s own community or those 
directed at the constituency of the terrorists. In essence, any anti-terrorism propaganda 
campaign must be well structured, coordinated and integrated considering both the 
importance of the communicator and the importance of the particular audience being 
targeted.  
 
Likewise, the Internet can be used by governmental and non-governmental 
organisations in positive ways to combat terrorism through educational campaigns, 
particularly those that promote non-violent forms of debate and dissent, such as those 
that encourage non-violent conflict resolution and promote negotiation and 
compromise (Weimann 2006a). Educational web campaigns can also actively 
challenge the “morally disengaged rhetoric” of terrorist movements and “can provide 
potential recruits with logical analysis of a groups’ purported grievances and 
activities” (Weimann 2006a, p. 240).  
 
Finally, Internet use by terrorist and extremist movements can be used to gather 
Intelligence necessary for counter- and anti- terrorism strategies. Such ‘Intell’ relating 
in particular to perceptions of successful attacks and acceptable targeting for example, 
may be useful in preparing for counter- and anti- terrorism initiatives and in the 
planning of intervention strategies. 
 
In conclusion, given the difficulty in tracking & tracing cyber communications, the 
lack of globally accepted processes & procedures for investigation and inadequate and 
ineffective information sharing between public & private sectors (Weimann & Von 
Knopp 2008), it is apparent that in order to attempt in any real way to combat terrorist 
use of the Internet at the very least there must be an international recognition and 
agreed definition of the problem area. Such definition and recognition of an 
international issue is essential for the evaluation of the problem from an international 
perspective in order to develop ‘International Strategies’ to attempt to combat it 
effectively.  
  
Bowman-Grieve, L. (2011). The Internet & terrorism: Pathways toward terrorism & 
counter-terrorism. In A. Silke (Ed.), Psychology, Terrorism and Counterterrorism. 
Oxon: Routledge, pp76-88. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
i www.Kahane.org is an Israeli Extremism website and the first website to be designated a terrorist 
organisation by the US Dept. of State, 2003. 
ii This website no longer exists but it was previously located at http://www.ulisnet.com which now 
appears to be an general information website made up of external links. 
iii This relates to supporting literature that sees terrorism as a strategic choice, see Crenshaw 1990.  
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